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Abstract: 
In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, "There is one thing of which one can 
say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." 
Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein’s statement is mistaken, while others have proposed 
various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert 
that it is impossible to describe the standard meter as being a meter long- Given that Wittgenstein introduces 
this sentence as analogous to the claim that "existence cannot be attributed to an element," and that the 
preceding passages discuss a language- game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there 
is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence. 
 
Article: 
In §50 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes a curious thing. He writes, "There is one 
thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the 
standard metre in Paris."
1
 There is, of course, nothing new in noting the oddity of the claim expressed by this 
sentence. Many philosophers have noted it before. Some believe that, regardless of its apparent oddity, the 
claim is true. Others insist that it is obviously false. Regardless of their evaluation of the truth of this sentence, 
however, everyone seems to agree about one thing: Wittgenstein not only wrote it, he intended to assert it. In 
what follows I will present some reasons for thinking that we can, in fact, say of the standard meter that it is a 
meter long.
2
 My main purpose, however, will be to demonstrate that it was not Wittgenstein's intention to deny 
this. The sentence is not an assertion of Wittgenstein's own view. Rather, it is a false statement of the sort to 
which his interlocutor (and Wittgenstein's own earlier self) would be committed. 
 
Before we get into detailed textual analysis, let me make a comment or two about reading Philosophical 
Investigations. As anyone who has studied it knows, one of many things that makes interpretation of this text so 
difficult is the fact that some passages are to be read as if in Wittgenstein's voice, and some are to be read as if 
in the voice of his interlocutor. A transparent example of this is found in the very first section: 
 
—It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. —"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red, 
and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" —Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. 
—But what is the meaning of the word "five"? —No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used. 
 
There are clearly two voices in this passage, and if we were to do a dramatic reading of it the person taking the 
part of Wittgenstein would read the statements, while a person playing an interlocutor read the questions. That 
both questions are in the interlocutor's voice is obvious, despite the fact that the first is in scare quotes while the 
second is not. Unfortunately it is not always this clear when an unquoted sentence belongs to the interlocutor. 
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 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Wittgenstein (¹95S). 
2
 Throughout this paper I will write as if the standard for being a meter long is a metal bar in Paris- This is no longer true, but that fact has no bearing on our 
current discussion. 
But things are even more complicated. Some sentences are to be read in Wittgenstein's voice, but not as 
statements he wishes to assert. In conversation, you or I might rephrase an opponent's point-to make sure we 
have it right, or to put it in terms that highlight its problems, etc.-and Wittgenstein does the same sort of thing at 
various points in the Investigations. Here is a clear instance: 
 
But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is not a name? —That is just the 
reason.... if "Excalibur" is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object 
would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a 
word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something 
corresponding to the words of which it consists. (§39) 
 
Again, if we were to do a dramatic reading of the Investigations this response would certainly be read by the 
person playing Wittgenstein; but the view expressed cannot be attributed to him. He is merely setting out his 
interlocutor's line of thought. 
 
I agree with the received interpretation that the statement about the standard meter is in Wittgenstein's voice. 
But as the passage just quoted shows, that is not sufficient to make it an expression of his view. Wittgenstein 
introduces the standard meter as a means of translating the discussion about an hypothesized type of object 
(Tractarian ultimate elements) into an analogous discussion carried on in terms of objects of a more familiar and 
undisputed type (standards).
3
 When Wittgenstein writes: "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it 
is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris" he is merely 
translating a Tractarian statement about ultimate elements into a statement about standards in preparation for 
that discussion. The Wittgenstein of the Investigations no more endorses the statement that results from this 
translation than he endorses the original. 
 
I. 
Before I demonstrate that it is possible to describe the standard meter as being a meter long, and that 
Wittgenstein knew this, let me give a few illustrations of the sort of thing that has been said by the philosophers 
with whom I am disagreeing. Some of them believe that the standard meter can be said to be a meter long, and 
some do not. But none defend their assumption that Wittgenstein denied the possibility of describing the 
standard meter in this way. 
 
For instance, in Naming and Necessity Kripke writes: 
 
Another sort of example in the literature is that one meter is to be the length of S where S is a certain stick or bar in Paris.... 
Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this. He says: "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter 
long nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris...." This seems to be a very 'extraordinary property,, 
actually, for any stick to have. I think he must be wrong .
4
 
 
Despite the oddity of the claim he is attributing to Wittgenstein, Kripke does not pause to consider the 
possibility that there might be a more charitable reading of the relevant passage. 
 
On Robert Fogelin's interpretation, Wittgenstein himself recognized the (apparent) oddity of which Kripke 
complains. After quoting §50 Fogelin paraphrases what he takes Wittgenstein to have been saying: 
 
To begin with, it may not seem obvious that we cannot say of the standard meter that it is a meter long; indeed, we may be inclined to 
say the opposite, that it is the only thing that really is one meter long. But suppose, for a moment, we analyze the claim that x is a 
meter long as the assertion that x has the same length as the standard meter. In this case, the claim that the standard meter is a meter 
long amounts to saying that the standard meter is the same length as the standard meter. Thus our attempt to ascribe a length to the 
standard meter leads to the formulation of an empty tautology which, of course, does not attribute a length to a particular object.
5
 
                                                 
3
 As will be noted below, the statement about the standard meter is explicitly introduced as analogous to the statement that neither existence nor nonexistence 
can be attributed to an element. 
4
  Kripke, (1980), p. 54. 
5
  Fogelin, (1995), p. I27. 
 
Elsewhere Fogelin mentions that if the object currently playing the role of standard meter is replaced by 
another, it might then be said to be a meter long; "for we can always remove something from its position as 
standard and measure it against some other standard."
6
 But he does not question the fact that Wittgenstein held 
that insofar as an object is the standard meter, it can neither be said to be nor not to be a meter long. 
 
And finally, Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, in the first volume of their analytical commentary on 
Philosophical Investigations write: "Wittgenstein agrees [with his interlocutor] that the standard metre cannot 
be said to be or not to be one metre long, but interprets this as merely marking the special role of the standard 
metre in the institution of measurement.
7
 Like Fogelin, they correctly note that the rod or stick used as the 
standard meter is so used only continently, and might be replaced. If this object were replaced, and ceased to be 
the standard, then we might describe it as being a meter long. But they insist that —That is one metre', `The 
length of that is one metre', etc., uttered when pointing at the standard metre could not but be grammatical, i.e., 
ostensive explanations."
8
 That is, as long as this stick is the standard meter, it cannot meaningfully be described 
either as being, or as not being a meter long. 
 
Even those who intend to defend Wittgenstein often agree that it initially appears possible to describe the 
standard meter as being a meter long. Thus, it's worthwhile noting that anyone who holds this combination of 
views—that it initially appears possible to say the standard meter is a meter long, and that Wittgenstein rightly 
denies it really is possible—is committed to holding that Wittgenstein made one of two mistakes.
9
 She might 
say that Wittgenstein mistakenly believed it to be obvious that it's impossible to describe the standard meter this 
way. But even if it is true, it certainly isn't obvious, so he would have been mistaken about that. Alternatively, 
she might hold that he recognized that it isn't obvious. On this interpretation, however, Wittgenstein's discussion 
of the standard meter is in direct conflict with his general view of philosophy. On this interpretation his reason 
for saying that we cannot describe the standard meter as being a meter long is that this would not fit with an 
explanation of how things must be—even if only within a given language-game—despite how they appear. But 
perhaps his primary criticism of other philosophers is that they give these sorts of arguments in an attempt to 
provide explanations when they should, instead, accurately describe things the way they find them; "don't think, 
but look!" (§66) 
7 
 
II. 
In this section I'll use two stories to illustrate why I think that it is possible to describe the standard meter as 
being a meter long, regardless of what Wittgenstein says. In the next I'll demonstrate that he wouldn't dispute 
this. 
 
Although few writers put any qualifications on the claim that it is impossible to describe the standard meter as 
being a meter long, it seems safe to assume that what they mean is that this is impossible insofar as the person 
offering the description recognizes that what is being described is the standard meter. Nevertheless, although 
this is a much more plausible claim, it is still false. Consider the following story: 
 
Ms. Jones is a rich collector of unusual objects, and an avid reader of the later Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, she 
is also a bit demented. One day, after having spent too much time pondering §50 of Philosophical 
Investigations, Ms. Jones decides that she must possess the standard meter—even though she recognizes that it 
has no extraordinary properties. Thus she sets about planning to steal it. She does a bit of research and discovers 
where the standard meter is, and that it is kept in a room with many other measurement standards. 
Unfortunately, the theft will have to occur at night, and Ms. Jones despairs of being able to read the labels and 
find the stick she wants. But then she hits upon an idea. She will bring along a meter stick from the local hard-
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 Ibid., p. 128. 
7
 Baker, G. P. and P- M. S- Hacker, (¹980), p. 292. 
8
  Ibid., p. 293, my emphasis. 
9
 I note this because some discussions of this topic have evidently been motivated by the belief that Wittgenstein cannot be mistaken- 
That is not my view, nor is it the view of any of the philosophers mentioned in this paper. 
ware store and measure the standards. Surely the one that is a meter long will be the standard meter. So this is 
what she does. While an accomplice stands watch by the door, Ms. Jones measures the likely looking sticks 
until, at last, she calls out: "I've found it. This one is the standard meter. It is a meter long." Ms. Jones knows 
that what she has in her hand is the standard meter, and it certainly looks as if she has just said of it that it is a 
meter long. 
 
Here's the second story: Imagine that we come across an unfamiliar civilization—either in some wilderness on 
this planet, or on another planet—and we set upon the task of translating its language into English. We expect, 
of course, that when we translate their claims about the lengths of things we will not merely have to translate, 
we will also have to do some conversions; just as we convert measurements given in terms of feet and yards 
into measurements given in terms of meters. But suppose we make the happy discovery that this civilization has 
a measurement standard that is precisely the same length as the standard meter bar in Paris. That is, as we would 
put it, the object they use as a standard is precisely one meter long. What we have discovered is that we can 
translate their word (let's say it is "retem") into our language without doing any conversions, and that the correct 
translation for "retem" is "meter". The foreigners' word means the same thing as "meter". This being the case, if 
the table at which I am writing is a meter long, a foreigner can correctly describe it in his own language using a 
sentence which means: "This table is one meter long". Moreover, just as I have told you that the measurement 
standard for this civilization is precisely a meter long, someone from our imagined civilization can explain to 
his friend that in our language "meter" refers to a certain length, and that our standard for this length is precisely 
one retem long. That is, in full knowledge of the significance of what he is saying, he can utter a sentence 
meaning; "The standard meter bar in Paris is a meter long." 
 
These examples seem to me to show that it is possible to describe the standard meter stick as being a meter 
long, and that it is possible to do so even when you know that what you are describing is the standard meter.
10
 
Now, can we find a reasonable interpretation of §50 which does not commit Wittgenstein to the opposite view? 
 
III. 
The following two paragraphs provide a very brief overview of what I see happening in §50 and the sections 
immediately preceding it. The next two sections expand upon and defend my interpretation of these passages 
and explain why I don't think that Wittgenstein intended to assert that the standard meter bar in Paris is the one 
thing of which one can say neither that it is nor that it is not a meter long. 
 
§50 begins with a question referring back to §46, so this seems a good place to start. In this section Wittgenstein 
quotes Socrates as a means of sketching a particular view of language and the world. His real interest in this 
view, however, derives from the fact that it is one he himself held while writing the Tractatus. Socrates and the 
early Wittgenstein each took it as a consequence of the view presented in §46 that the elements out of which the 
world is constructed could not be described, nor, more particularly, could one say of them either that they exist 
or that they do not exist. Wittgenstein brings the picture presented in §46 into question in §47, by denying the 
existence of the ultimate elements which are central to it. In preparation for further discussion, in §48 he designs 
a language-game based on that picture; his point will be that even if the picture were correet, Socrates and the 
early Wittgenstein were mistaken regarding its consequences. Working with language-game (48), in §49 
Wittgenstein argues that objects playing the role of element within a given language-game can, nonetheless, be 
described within that very language-game; they can even be described by means of the names they themselves 
give meaning.
11
 And in §50 he demonstrates that, contra Socrates and his own earlier self, elements (even 
within a language-game) can also be said to exist. Interestingly, Wittgenstein also notes that the very view 
which can lead one to believe that elements cannot be said to exist (or to fail to exist) may simultaneously lead 
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 See the final paragraph of this paper for one more reason for thinking that the standard meter is a meter long- 
 
11 This is not to say that association with an object playing the role of element is sufficient, 
by itself, to determine the meaning of a name. As Wittgenstein stresses here and elsewhere, a background of activities is required. But 
given this background, a particular object may have a special role in determining the meaning of a particular word. 
one to believe that they must exist. But while certain things about a language-game would have been different 
had its elements not existed, their existence is not metaphysically necessary. 
 
The standard meter is mentioned only in the last of these passages, §50, where an analogy is drawn between the 
Tractatus/Theaetetus claim that elements cannot be said either to exist or not to exist and the claim that the 
standard meter cannot be said either to be or not to be a meter long. In my view, Wittgenstein makes use of this 
analogy precisely because most people find the claim about the standard meter obviously false. fie is arguing 
that (anything legitimately called) an element can be said to exist, so given that he says the claims are 
analogous, we would expect him hold that the standard meter can be said to be a meter long. Moreover, in §49 
he argues for the possibility of describing an object using a term which derives its meaning (in large part) from 
its association with that very object, so we know that he would object to using this sort of reason for refusing to 
describe the standard meter as being a meter long. Finally, just as the view of language shared by Socrates and 
the early Wittgenstein also makes it tempting to think that elements must exist, it can also be tempting to think 
that a standard must be of the kind for which it plays the role of standard. But just as in the earlier case, there is 
no metaphysical necessity here. That object which is the standard might have been relevantly different than it 
is.
12
 
 
IV. 
If we are to understand the use to which Wittgenstein intended to put the statement "There is one thing of which 
one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in 
Paris" it is imperative that we take into account the context in which that statement is found. Of course, the 
topics of the Investigations are notoriously intertwined, and passages from one part of the book are likely to be 
relevant to passages from anywhere else. Nonetheless, as indicated in my summary, I will limit my discussion 
to §50 and the immediately preceding sections. 
 
§50 itself begins with the question: "What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being 
to elements?" In asking this question Wittgenstein is referring four sections back, to §46, and this is where we 
will begin. That section consists almost entirely of a quotation from the Theaetetus, in which Socrates puts forth 
a particular view of the world and of language. On this view the world consists entirely of indivisible elements 
and the objects constructed out of them, and Socrates supposes it to follow that existence cannot be attributed to 
these basic elements. 
 
If I make no mistake, I have heard some people say this: there is no definition of the primary elements—so to speak—out of which we 
and everything else are composed; for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, 
neither that it is nor that it is not---. Must as what consists of these primary elements is itself complex, so the names of the elements 
become descriptive language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech is the composition of names. (§46) 
 
The picture described here should be familiar to anyone who has read Wittgenstein's early work. It is a 
statement of a central part of the Tractatus picture of language.
13
 This is confirmed by the last sentence of §46: 
"Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements." 
Thus it is against his own earlier self that Wittgenstein is arguing in §§47-50, and it is the Tractarian picture that 
captivates the interlocutor in these passages. Or, if you prefer, in these passages the interlocutor is the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. 
 
The later Wittgenstein's first point, in §47, is to criticize a notion central to the Tractatus/Theaetetus picture of 
language: the notion of an element or absolute simple. Being simple is simply the flip side of having 
components or being complex. But, the later Wittgenstein argues, there is no single type of complexity. 
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 Much of this discussion, in §50, is carried on in terms of a standard patch of sepia, rather than in terms of the standard meter. As 
far as I can see, Wittgenstein's point in no way hangs on this. 
13
  „Objects are simple-” (TLP 2.02) "A name means an object- The object is its meaning-" (TLP 3.203) "The configuration of objects 
in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign-" (TLP 3.21) 
If I tell someone without any further explanation: "What I see before me now is composite", he will have the right to ask: "What do 
you mean by 'composite,? For there are all sorts of things that that can mean!" —The question "Is what you see composite?" makes 
good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity—that is, which particular use of the word—is in question. (§47) 
 
The point, of course, is that what plays the role of element in one language-game need not play that role in 
another. Thus, even if it were true that insofar as an object is an element (in a particular language-game) it could 
not be described (in that language-game), it would not follow that the object could not be described. There 
would always be other language-games in which the object was not an element, and there would be no reason to 
think that it couldn't be described in those. 
 
From this we see that even if it were true, in a certain sense, that an element could not be described, this fact 
would have no metaphysical significance. It would merely be an artifact of a particular language-game. 
Ultimately, any object you can name can certainly be described in one language- game or another. 
 
Something very similar can be said about the standard meter. Even if it were true that the object which plays the 
role of standard meter could not (currently) be described as being a meter long, this would not be a fact of any 
metaphysical import. And, indeed, in §50 Wittgenstein says just this: "But this is, of course, not to ascribe any 
extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-
rule." That object which currently plays the role of standard meter could be replaced by another. If this happens 
the first object would no longer be the standard, and no one doubts that it could then be correctly described as 
being a meter long. As was mentioned in section I, it is acknowledged by numerous writers, including Fogelin 
and Baker and Hacker, that it would be possible to describe as a meter long an object which used to be the 
standard meter, and that Wittgenstein argued for this. 
 
So leaving to one side whether or not there is a sense in which Socrates is right that it is impossible to describe 
elements, in §47 Wittgenstein demonstrates that he would be wrong in giving this any ultimate significance—
because the only elements there are are objects playing a certain role within a language-game, and these could 
obviously be described elsewhere. In the end, however, Wittgenstein does not grant Socrates or his own earlier 
self even this much. That is, in the end the later Wittgenstein denies that it is impossible to describe elements, 
even taking into account that something is an element only within a particular language-game. In the very 
language- game within which an object plays the role of element, that object can be described. This argument is 
made in §48 and §49. In §50 he will then go on to show that even the more specific claim that (within a given 
language- game) elements cannot be described as existing is mistaken. 
 
In §48 and §49 Wittgenstein uses the same method that he used in the first few sections of the Investigations.
14
 
This method has two parts. (1) Design a language-game on the model of a picture described by another 
philosopher. (This is also always a model of a picture accepted in the Tractatus.) (2) Demonstrate that what that 
philosopher (and the early Wittgenstein) thought had to follow from this picture does not, in fact, follow. In §2 
Wittgenstein designed the slab language-game to fit Augustine's picture of words as labels, and attempted to 
show, among other things, that ostensive definition is not sufficient for teaching even such a simple language. In 
§48 he designs a language-game to fit Socrates' picture of the world and language. As we noted, the aspects of 
the Tractatus focused on here are the ideas that there are elements and names referring to them, that complexes 
are made up of these elements, and that the descriptions of those complexes are straightforward concatenations 
of the names of the elements. What the later Wittgenstein wants to show, among other things, is that even in a 
language-game designed according to the Tractarian picture it is possible to describe the elements. Moreover, 
he wants to show that it is possible to describe the elements using the very words the meanings of which, given 
the background of the language-game, are determined by association with those elements. 
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 "Letus apply the method of §2 to the account in the Theaetetus. Let us consider a language-game for which this account is really 
valid." (§48) 
The elements in the language-game Wittgenstein describes in §48 are unit colored squares, and the complexes 
are larger squares made up of the elements. He says that all the names in the language-game are names of 
colored squares, and the sentences are concatenations of these names arranged in a specific order so as to 
represent complex squares. Thus, "R," "G," "W," and "II" are the names he gives to the red, green, white, and 
black unit squares respectively, and each letter means what it does because it is associated with squares of this 
color rather than with squares of that color. Concatenations of names, such as "RRGW," describe complex 
squares. 
 
One of the things that the reader may find distressing about Wittgenstein's description of language-game (48) is 
that it is not clear whether he wants its names to be thought of as proper names of particular squares or as 
predicates. Or, rather, it appears that his names are ambiguous between the two. But when we recognize that 
(48) is intended as a model of the Tractarian picture of language, this is no longer a problem. This is precisely 
the ambiguity we find in the Tractatus, and so any model of its picture of language should embody the same 
ambiguity. Of course, that ambiguity is a problem, but that it shows up in §48 is not.
15
 
 
With the language-game of §48 set up, Wittgenstein is prepared to discuss the picture of language it models. 
§49 begins with a question closely related to the one, quoted above, with which §50 begins. In this case, 
however, the question is asked specifically about the elements of language-game (48). Wittgenstein asks, "But 
what does it mean to say that we cannot define (that is, describe) these elements, but only name them?" In 
answer he suggests, "This might mean, for instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one 
square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square." As an explanation of what it means to say 
that the elements cannot be described, this response would be an odd one. It is closer to an account of what it is 
to describe a single element; "its description is simply the name of the coloured square." (my emphasis) 
However what Wittgenstein is really offering is an explanation, from his current perspective, of what he might 
have meant in the Tractatus when he said that elements can only be named. On that view, by definition "R" 
uttered by itself is a name. Thus, whenever this term is uttered by itself, a name is uttered. And so, in the 
limiting case, the (element) square is named. But, as Wittgenstein now points out, even if the word uttered by 
itself is a name, it does not really follow from this that what is uttered is not a description. 
 
This case is mentioned again a little further on in §49. Here Wittgenstein makes it even clearer that he believes 
that the elements of language-game (48) can be described within that language-game. "Ulf A has to describe 
complexes of coloured squares to B and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word is a 
description—a proposition." What he has in mind is something like this: One member of the language-game has 
the job of describing squares to another who cannot see them. The described squares may be complex, but they 
may also be simple. When the square to be described is complex the person offering the description utters a 
sentence made up of at least four words. But when what is to be described is a unit square, the description 
consists of a single word. Despite the fact that the speaker utters only one word, as in the other cases the 
utterance is a description. Thus, even if it had been true that a name was uttered whenever one of the words of 
this language was uttered by itself, this would have been consistent with its being the case that, at the same 
time, a description was given. 
 
In fact, however, Wittgenstein argues that whether we are to call "R" uttered by itself a description or a name 
depends on the situation. When used in situations of the sort just described, "R" is a description. 
 
But if [a member of this language-game] is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the 
words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R", 
for instance, is not a description; it names an element... 
 
and he concludes this sentence, "... but it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can 
only be named!" That is, in certain circumstances a word is a name, and is properly said to name a specific 
                                                 
15
 Thanks to Jim Hopkins for pointing this out to me. 
object. But this in no way tells against the fact that in other circumstances that very word is a description, and 
describes that very object. 
 
A word can be construed as a name when it is being taught. It is a name insofar as a certain sort of association 
between that word and a given object is being set up or referred to, rather than used. Of course, the lesson of the 
discussion surrounding §2 and elsewhere was that, contra the Tractarian view, the relevant sort of association is 
not merely a matter of a word being the label of an object. Knowing an object's name is not merely a matter of 
knowing to which object the word is attached. It is also knowing what to do with the word within a language-
game, and perhaps also how to use that object. "We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has 
been named. It has not even got a name except in a language-game." (§49) Nonetheless, within a given 
language-game an association can be set up between a sound or mark and an object, and the sound or mark is a 
name insofar as it is associated with a thing in this way. Moreover, although association with an object is not, 
by itself, sufficient to give a word meaning, given the appropriate background conditions it is the fact that the 
sound/mark is associated with this object rather than that one, with the red square rather than with the green 
one, that gives it its specific meaning. Thus, we can say that the object with which a word is associated 
determines the meaning of that word, in much the same way that we can say that Mrs. O'Leary's cow caused the 
Chicago fire. The cow couldn't have done it all by herself, but having once acknowledged this, in many contexts 
of discussion we can take the remaining conditions for granted. 
 
V. 
Let us now move on to §50, the passage in which the standard meter is actually mentioned. Because this is the 
central section, we will go through it pretty much line-by-line. 
 
As I've mentioned, this section begins with a question that refers back to §46, and to the Tractatus: "What 
would it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?" Wittgenstein's first 
response takes into account the perspective of someone who accepts that picture: 
 
—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions 
between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being); just as when everything that we call "destruction" lies 
in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the destruction of an element. 
 
In other words, if we accept that the world consists of basic elements and the things built out of them, then it 
makes no sense to talk about the destruction of an element; by definition, anything that can come apart would 
not be an element. And if existence is a matter of being constructed out of elements, then it cannot make sense 
to talk about an element existing. But, clearly, this is not a picture that Wittgenstein now endorses. 
 
Although he himself does not make explicit his argument regarding the possibility of attributing existence to 
elements, it is natural to suppose that Wittgenstein would endorse one that parallels the argument regarding 
description of elements we attributed to him when discussing §47. The central premise in both cases would be 
the denial of the idea that there are elements in an absolute sense. Once it is admitted that what plays the role of 
element in one language-game need not play it in another, it is easy to see that even if existence could not be 
attributed to an object from within a language-game in which it played that role, that would be no reason to 
deny that existence could be attributed to it in another language-game. Similarly, and as also noted earlier, even 
if an object, call it "M," could not be said to be a meter long while it was playing the role of standard meter, this 
fact would carry no metaphysical significance. In another language-game, or in a variation on this one, a 
different object could be the standard, and then there will be no difficulty in describing M as being a meter long. 
 
The second paragraph of §50 is the one in which the standard meter is mentioned. This paragraph begins: "One 
would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not 
even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it." From much that he says elsewhere, we already know that 
the later Wittgenstein does not believe it to be impossible to attribute existence to elements. When he says this 
is what one would like to say he means that this is what his interlocutor would like to say, or, what comes to the 
same thing, that this is what he himself said in the Tractatus. The argument went something like this: The very 
meaning of the word naming an element depends on its actual association with that particular element, so if the 
element didn't exist there wouldn't be a meaningful word to use to talk about it—and so one could say nothing 
of it at all. 
 
Wittgenstein continues: 
 
—But let us consider an analogous case. There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one 
metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. —But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to 
mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule. (§50) 
 
Given the interlocutor's (as well as his earlier self's) reason for insisting on the impossibility of attributing 
existence or non-existence to elements, it appears that she is (and he was) also committed the claim that it is 
impossible to say of the standard meter either that it is or that it is not a meter long. The interlocutor has 
(correctly) noted that if a particular element were deleted from a language-game the word that names it would 
have no meaning. (By "deleted" I do not mean that the object is merely removed or destroyed. Rather we must 
imagine a world in which everything regarding this language-game is the same, except that this object is 
lacking. In a world in which you never existed, you have no name.) It is also true that if the actual object which 
is the standard meter were deleted from our language-game in this way "meter" would have no meaning.
16
 Thus, 
if this is the interlocutor's reason for denying the first possibility, he must also deny the second. But surely, 
Wittgenstein insists, his interlocutor cannot believe that this would indicate anything special about the object 
someone just happened to choose for the standard meter. Wittgenstein shows that she should not believe that 
there is anything special about her so-called elements. Despite his own earlier view on the subject, there is 
nothing metaphysically important going on here. 
 
We have already seen that the later Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of ultimate elements, and thus it is 
indisputable that he rejects the claim that there are ultimate elements such that we cannot attribute existence to 
them. But what if that claim is relativized to a given language-game? Does he believe that, within a given 
language-game, it is impossible to describe as existing those objects playing the role of elements? Certainly 
Wittgenstein does not accept the more general claim that within a given language-game the objects playing the 
role of elements cannot be described. As we saw, that was a central point of §49. When we look at the third and 
final paragraph of §50 we will find important connections between it and §49 which support the view that 
Wittgenstein would not grant his interlocutor's prohibition on attributing existence to elements, even within a 
given language-game. In particular, he would not grant this prohibition within the language-game designed on 
the Tractatus model. Moreover, the later Wittgenstein nowhere says anything to give us reason to suppose that 
he accepts such a prohibition. Given all of this we also have reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to 
assert the claim that the standard meter cannot be described as being a meter long—even from inside the 
language-game in which it is the standard. 
 
As just mentioned, there are some important connections between the third paragraph of §50 and §49. One 
connection that is not of obvious importance is that the objects discussed in both instances are colored objects. 
Nevertheless, perhaps it is as an attempt to bring his discussion of standards closer to the §§48 and 49 
discussion of elements that at the end of the second paragraph Wittgenstein invites his interlocutor and us to 
imagine a color standard in place of the more ready-to-hand standard meter. "Let us imagine samples of colour 
being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia 
which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this 
colour or that it is not." (§50) Again, Wittgenstein writes that a particular standard cannot be said either to be or 
not to be of the kind for which it is a standard. But, again, we have reason to doubt that he intends what he has 
written as an assertion of his own position. He is merely replacing the standard meter example with the standard 
sepia example, and assuming that his interlocutor must take the same attitude towards both. To see this we must 
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 Again, it is not enough to merely remove the object. We must be considering a world in which the language-game is the same, 
except that it is lacking this object—and nothing has replaced it. 
move on to the final paragraph of the section. (Note that from the beginning of this paragraph the discussion is 
of what takes place within a language-game. Thus, if Wittgenstein is here arguing against the impossibility of 
attributing existence to elements he is arguing that it is possible, within a language-game, to attribute existence 
to the objects playing the role of elements.) 
 
We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not 
something that is represented, but is a means of representation. —And just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we 
name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If 
it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-
game.—What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which 
comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-
game—our method of representation. (§5O) 
 
What is the it that we can "put like this"? Presumably it is the point behind the previous sentence: "Then it will 
make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not." Although it may sound as if 
the claim made at the beginning of the paragraph just quoted is that there is some other object that the standard 
represents, that is an unlikely interpretation. Rather, it is best understood as the claim that the standard is an 
object which allows the possibility of representation within a languagegame—and therefore cannot itself be 
represented in that language-game. 
 
But to say, as Wittgenstein does here, that a point can be put in a certain way is neither to assert nor to deny that 
the point being explained is one's own. So we thus far have no reason to assume either that Wittgenstein accepts 
that the standard cannot be represented or that he does not. 
 
What follows the first "—," however, gives us reason to doubt that the view he has just been explaining is his 
own. Here Wittgenstein refers back to language-game (48). As you will recall, language-game (48), modeled on 
the Tractarian view, was designed to show that elements can be described, and that they can be described in a 
language-game in which they are playing the role of element. So it is not plausible to suppose that he would 
invoke this passage in order to say something about how standards cannot be described within the language-
games for which they allow. Moreover, in §49 Wittgenstein argued that the elements of (48) could be described 
using their own names, and there is clearly a parallel between this and the idea that a standard can be described 
as belonging to the kind for which it is a standard. Thus, when he says, "—And just this goes for an element in 
language-game (48) when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-
game," he is saying, "Well, yes, the standard is a means of representation, and has a special role in the language-
game; but (recalling what I said in (48)) it would be queer to make that a reason for saying that a standard can 
only be a means of representation."
17
 So Wittgenstein is granting that his interlocutor is partly right, although 
she has come to an illegitimate conclusion when she assumes that certain things cannot be said about elements 
or standards. She is right that the standard is a `means of representation' and that there is a sense in which 
without it certain things could not be said. But she is mistaken in concluding that these things cannot be said 
about the standard itself. 
 
Continuing in this vein, in the next sentence Wittgenstein again grants that his interlocutor is partially correct. It 
is true, in some sense, that "if an element] did not exist, it could have no name." (Similarly, it is true, in a sense, 
that if it were not for the standard, "meter" would have no meaning.) This point was conceded above. But from 
the fact that in a certain counterfactual situation (i.e., if these things did not exist) certain utterances could not be 
made it does not follow that they cannot be made in the actual situation. In our actual language-games, the 
things that play the role of elements can be said to exist, and the standard meter can be said to be a meter long. 
 
Recall, also, that what is quoted here, "'If it did not exist, it could have no name'," was originally put forth as the 
sort of thing the interlocutor might give as an explanation of the purported fact that existence cannot be 
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 In this situation the word "R", for instance, is not a description; it names an element—but it would be queer to make that a 
reason for saying that an element can only be named!" (§49) 
attributed to an element.
18
 But notice how odd this explanation is. To say that "if it did not exist, it could have 
no name" is actually to assert that if it has a name it exists—and no one has denied that an element has a name. 
We saw a parallel in §49. In that section "its description is simply the name" (my emphasis) was presented as 
the sort of thing an interlocutor might offer as an explanation of why elements cannot be described. We noted 
that this would be a very odd explanation, as it presupposes the presence of a description. Thus, within a 
language-game the following is true: The description of an element can be the same word as its name, and an 
element can be asserted to exist. 
 
VI. 
So here, in a nutshell, are my reasons for thinking that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert the impossibility of 
describing the standard meter as being a meter long. Firstly, Wittgenstein is usually very sensitive to and 
respectful of ordinary use of language and critical of philosophers' attempts to `fix' it, and-as most people agree 
it seems natural to say that the standard meter is a meter long. Secondly, the claim that the standard meter 
cannot be said to be a meter long is introduced as analogous to the claim that elements cannot be said to exist, a 
Tractarian claim the later Wittgenstein clearly rejects. Given that we know he rejects the first, we have some 
reason to believe he rejects the second. Moreover, thirdly, Wittgenstein does not merely reject his own earlier 
claim that there are elements to which existence cannot be attributed, he rejects the claim that existence cannot 
be attributed to an object within the language-game within which it plays the role of element. He does this in a 
paragraph (§50) in which he continues to assume an analogy between elements and standards. Thus there is 
every reason to believe that just as he rejects the claim that existence cannot be attributed elements when this 
claim is relativized to a language-game, so he rejects the claim that the standard meter cannot be said to be a 
meter long, relativized to our language-game of measuring with a meter-rule. Fourth and finally, considering 
what was said by the philosophers mentioned in section I, if any reason for thinking that the standard meter 
cannot be described as a meter long is given in these passages, it is that this object is an instrument of our 
measuring language- game. But Wittgenstein rejects the notion that the fact that an object playing the role of 
element is an instrument of a language-game prohibits us from attributing existence to it from within that 
language-game. So although he says that the standard is an instrument, it is implausible to hold that he believed 
this constituted a reason for thinking that the standard meter couldn't be said to be a meter long. 
 
Before closing let me briefly address two objections to the suggestion that "meter" can be applied to the 
standard meter. Most baldly put, the first objection is that something cannot be used to represent itself, and that 
this is what a person would be doing if she attempted to say of the standard meter that it is a meter long. But this 
is surely mistaken. As John Malkovitch has demonstrated by playing John Malkovitch in Being John 
Malkovitch, it is possible for something to represent itself.
19
 This example is perhaps unfair, because there may 
be something importantly different about proper names. But it also seems to me that the first creature labeled 
"stegosaurus" is a stegosaurus, even though all other creatures merit the name only insofar as they are of the 
same kind as it. It (or its skeleton) is the standard. Maybe this example is importantly disanalogous as well, but 
an argument would have to be given to show that it is, and I do not know of one. 
 
The second objection is that the only picture that allows one to say that the standard meter is a meter long is one 
in which the standard directly picks out some other kind of object—abstract or Platonic, perhaps—which is then 
used to measure it. In addition to postulating the existence of objects Wittgenstein would be suspicious of, and 
thereby postulating an explanation where we should be describing—this objection continues—this view 
assumes something like the direct labeling picture Wittgenstein argues against at the beginning of the 
Investigations. The alternative—the objection concludes—is that the standard meter has a role in the language-
game of being that against which things are measured. Ultimately it is the only thing against which objects can 
be compared in order to determine whether or not they are a meter long. On the objector's view, then, to say that 
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 From the second paragraph of §50, "One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not 
exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it." 
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 I owe this example to Jon Barton. 
the standard meter is a meter long would be like demonstrating that one knows how tall one is by putting one's 
hand atop one's head.
20 
 
Although I have no doubt Wittgenstein would reject the first picture, I see no reason for believing that the only 
alternative is the one the objector assumes. Of course, Wittgenstein does say that the standard is an instrument 
of the language-game, but he does not provide a detailed account of how this instrument is used. And, as 
previously noted, he also calls the elements of §48 instruments of the language while at the same time arguing 
that they can be described by means of their names. To say, as he does, that an object is "something with which 
comparison is made" is not to offer a complete description of its role and I have seen no argument proving that 
this role must rule out the possibility of saying that the standard meter is a meter long. 
 
Insofar as to say that the standard meter is a meter long is to offer a description of it, we should also be careful 
to bear in mind Wittgenstein's repeated observation that there are many types of description which serve many 
different purposes. Thus, to hold that Wittgenstein denied that it is possible to say of the standard meter that it is 
a meter long is not merely to hold that he would have insisted that "The standard meter is a meter long" fails to 
serve a specific purpose. It is to hold that he would have denied that the sentence can serve any purpose in 
virtue of which it could constitute a true (or even a false) description. 
 
In the first section of this paper I mentioned that many interpreters hold that the object which is now the 
standard meter could be said to be a meter long if it ceased to be the standard, and that Wittgenstein would 
agree with this. Those who say this do not usually give the impression of intending to say that in such a 
situation "meter" changes its meaning. If that's right, then unless they are willing to deny that it has any length 
at all, they must admit that the standard meter is the same length it would be if it were a meter long. It is hard to 
see how this differs from saying that it is a meter long. The language-game of measuring with a meter-rule may 
be one that requires a standard against which things are measured, but it is a subtle one, and one which allows 
this standard to be replaced by another.
21
 As the "retem" example of section Il was intended to show, it is also 
one that can be played by different persons using different standards. Thus, until someone gives a full account 
of how this language-game works which proves otherwise, I see no reason for denying the obvious truth that the 
standard meter is a meter long. And until someone gives a full account of Wittgenstein's picture which shows 
otherwise, I see no reason for thinking he denies it either.
22
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